January 25, 2005
The South could do without more troops
Anuraj Manibhandu is Editorial Pages Editor, Bangkok Post
The cabinet's expected
consideration, and likely approval, today of an
army plan to set up an elite force for the South shows that military and
civilian authorities have learned nothing from more than a year of
violence in the region.
By the army's own admission, 333 state officials and local residents
have been killed in a total of 888 incidents confirmed as linked to
insurgency activities from Jan 4 to Dec 31, 2004. The past weeks have
seen a resurgence of attacks after the anniversary of the raid on an
arms depot in Cho Airong district of Narathiwat passed relatively
peacefully. And the perpetrators are becoming more brazen, risking and
receiving condemnation for firing on a school bus in Pattani last
Tuesday and injurying two children.
But despite the failure of the use of force, more of the same is to be
deployed in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.
Already some 20,000 troops are stationed in the restive provinces. They
include 15,000 infantrymen, many of whom were sent from different parts
of the country to beef up the locally-based Division 5, and about 5,000
from the navy. Infantry Division 15 will almost double the army presence
in the deep South as plans call for it to field 12,000 commissioned and
non-commissioned troops as well as draftees.
Technically, the cabinet's nod would revive the unit previously based
in Pran Buri district of Prachuap Khiri Khan dispersed following the
financial crisis in 1997. In what is seen as a bid to mollify critics,
the army has made a point of stressing that the unit would not only
engage in combat duty but also carry out development work and engage
local communities. But the public relations effort has not succeeded,
and the army is still seen to be applying force to fight a war that is
highly political.
Surachart Bamrungsuk, security analyst at Chulalongkorn University, has
emphasised that the political aspect of the counter-insurgency in the
South does not concern competition for popular support in the coming
general elections or promotion within one's own organisation. This
political war is ``about repercussions, and power to command trust and
loyalty'', he wrote in a recent article. The government's challenge in
2005 is to come up with ``positive measures'' to win the trust of local
people.
But security authorities still express outdated ideas and the
government is yet to overcome management problems. The removal of Pol
Lt-Gen Wongkot Maneerin as overall police commander in the South on
Thursday was a stark reminder of age-old contentions between the police
and military. His replacement, Pol Lt-Gen Paisal Tangchaitrong, promises
smoother relations as he is a former classmate of the army
commander-in-chief. But the country's two main security agencies should
not be held hostage to personal relations, and must invest in building a
professional system for mutual respect.
The continuing insurgency in the South cries out for a joint operations
approach that pools state resources and allows local participation.
Whether it should be modelled on the Civilian-Police-Military Command 43
disbanded in 2002 is debatable. That task force was set up 23 years ago
when the Cold War was still going strong, and any successor needs to
adapt to present-day conditions if it is to be useful.
The bolder tactics of insurgents, the persistence of inter-agency
rivalry and the insistence on applying a military-led strategy do not
bode well for the future of peace in the deep South.
The recent upsurge in attacks could be a response to the arrest of
ustaz, or Muslim religious teachers, as military authorities have
suggested. Eight teachers have been taken into custody in the past three
weeks, and warrants have been issued for the arrest of 21 on treason
charges.
But there is also logic in the view that insurgents are using the
pre-election vacuum to make their point. For weeks, politicians have
been busy campaigning, without any remarkable programme for bringing
peace to the region. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who may have
opened the door to insurgents and riled his opponents by saying he would
tackle the problem seriously after the polls, must follow through if he
is indeed re-elected.